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Examining Lender Liability Actions
After Foley: Are Tort Damages Still
Possible?

In past years, borrowers in California have sued lenders alleging
tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.' Where liability has been imposed on lenders, the availability
of tort damages, including punitive damages, has resulted in substantial awards to borrowers. 2 More recently, however, California
appellate courts have criticized cases imposing tort liability on lenders
and have refused to extend tort remedies to borrowers.' These
appellate courts held that the relationship existing between lender
and borrower is not sufficiently close to justify tort liability. 4 In so
holding, these appellate courts have analogized to the recent California Supreme Court case of Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation.'
In Foley, the California Supreme Court held that an employee
could not sue his employer for tortious breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.6 The Foley court disallowed tort

1. See, e.g., Lee v. Bank of America, 218 Cal. App. 3d 914, 267 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1990);
Security Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 213 Cal. App. 3d 927, 262 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1989)
(decertified pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 976, Dec. 21, 1989); Price v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1989); Mitsui Manufacturers Bank v.
Superior Court, 212 Cal. App. 3d 726, 260 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1989); Barrett v. Bank of America,
183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511,
514, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 552 (1985) (tort remedies awarded to depositor arising out of breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were $100,000).
3. Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1989); Mitsui
Manufacturers Bank v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. App. 3d 726, 260 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1989).
4. Price, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 741; Mitsui, 212 Cal. App. 3d at
731, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
5. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988). See Price, 213 Cal. App.
3d at 478; Mitsui, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 731.
6. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d at 700, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr.
at 239-40.
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remedies in the employment context because the relationship existing
between employer and employee is not sufficiently close to warrant
such remedies. 7 According to the Foley court, tort remedies are only
justified for breach of the implied covenant of good faith when the
relationship between plaintiff and defendant is "sufficiently similar"
to that existing between an insurer and an insured. 8 Thus, Foley
requires borrowers seeking tort remedies for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith to show sufficient similarities between the
lending and the insurance relationship to warrant extension of tort
remedies to the lending relationship. 9
The California Supreme Court has not yet considered a lender
liability suit seeking tort remedies. It is interesting to note, however,
that the supreme court has declined to hear two cases on this issue, 0
decertifying one which held in favor of the borrower." Such actions
by the court have led some writers to question whether lender liability
actions continue to be viable.' 2 The position advanced in this Comment is that tort liability for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the lender/borrower context is not precluded
by the Foley decision. Under certain fact situations, the relationship
existing between lender and borrower will be of sufficient similarity
to that existing between insurer and insured to justify tort remedies
3
under the guidelines set forth by Foley.
Part I of this Comment discusses the relationship found to exist
between insurer and insured which justifies tort damages for the
insurer's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

7.

Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35 (1988).

8. Id. The relationship between an insurer and an insured was termed a "special
relationship" by the California Supreme Court in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha, 24 Cal. 3d 809,
820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979). See infra notes 32-44 and accompanying
text (discussing Egan and the special relationship test).
9. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
10. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 213 Cal. App. 3d. 927, 262 Cal. Rptr. 260
(1989) (decertified pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 976, Dec. 21, 1989); Price v.
Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1989).
11. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 213 Cal. App. 3d. 927, 262 Cal. Rptr. 260
(1989) (decertified pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 976, Dec. 21, 1989).
12. See, e.g., Rice, Lender Liability Litigation Wave May Be Cresting, Los Angeles Daily

Journal, Jan. 12, 1990, at 1, col. I (lender liability lawsuits, which looked for a time like the
big-money wave of the 1980s, may be waving goodbye in the 1990s).

13.

See infra notes 136-201 and accompanying text (discussing fact situations which give

rise to such a relationship). See also Lee v. Bank of America, 218 Cal. App. 3d 914, 922-29,
267 Cal. Rptr. 387, 392-96 (1990) (Johnson, A.J. concurring and dissenting) (Justice Johnson's

dissenting opinion argues that when the fact situation is sufficient, a bank depositor may
maintain a cause of action against a bank for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing).
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dealing. 14 Part II discusses the Foley decision and the factors that
led the California Supreme Court to determine that tort damages are
not justified for an employer's breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. 15 Part III of this Comment will apply
the Foley factors to certain fact situations to demonstrate that tort
damages are appropriate in some lender/borrower cases.' 6
I.

THE INSURANCE CASES: EXISTENCE OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

In California, tort damages for breach of the implied covenant of
7
good faith and fair dealing were first allowed in the insurance context.'
Subsequent California cases analogized to the insurance context in
allowing tort damages for breach of the implied covenant in the
employment'8 and lending contexts. 9 It is thus logical to begin the
discussion of the tort of breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing with an examination of the tort in the insurance
context.
The California Supreme Court's first application of tort remedies
in an insurance context came in Comunale v. Traders & General
Insurance Co. 20 The Comunale court held that an insurance company's wrongful refusal to accept a third party's reasonable settlement
offer within policy limits was a violation of its duty to consider the
interests of the insured in good faith. 2' Such a failure to settle gave
the insured the option of suing the insurance company in tort or in
contract. 22
The rationale behind the imposition of tort damages in the insurance context was more fully developed in Crisci v. Security Insurance
Co. 23 The Crisci court awarded tort damages to compensate the
plaintiff for the mental suffering proximately caused by the insurance

14.

See infra notes 17-44 and accompanying text.

15.

See infra notes 45-105 and accompanying text.

16.
17.

See infra notes 108-214 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 20-44 and accompanying text (discussing tortious breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance context).
18. See infra notes 45-105 and accompanying text (discussing tort damages for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment context).
19. See infra notes 108-214 and accompanying text (discussing tort damages for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the lending context).
20. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
21. Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d at 661, 328 P.2d at 202.
22. Id. at 663, 328 P.2d at 203.
23. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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company's breach of the covenant of good faith. 24 The court stressed
that the insurer's breach of contract did not, by itself, constitute

tortious conduct.25 Rather, the tortious conduct consisted of the
insurer's failure to meet its duty to accept a third party's reasonable
settlement offer, "a duty included within the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. '

26

In reasoning that recovery of tort

damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith was
appropriate in the insurance context, as opposed to every breach of
covenant case, the Crisci court emphasized the nature of the rela-

tionship existing between insurer and insured. 27 Unlike contracts
entered into for commercial advantage, insureds enter into contracts
with insurers for protection against the risk of accidental losses and

the mental suffering that often accompanies such losses.2" Further,
insurers are well aware that insureds purchase liability insurance
specifically for the peace of mind provided by the insurance. 29 The
Crisci court concluded by stressing that where the contract directly
concerns the comfort, happiness, or personal esteem of one of the
parties, damages for mental suffering will be permitted. 0

In Egan v. Mutual of Omaha,31 the California Supreme Court
confronted the issue of whether, in addition to compensatory damages
and damages for emotional distress, an insured could recover punitive
damages for an insurer's breach of the implied covenant of good

24. In Crisci, the plaintiff, a 70-year old widow, was found liable for $101,000 as the
defendant in a previous personal injury action brought by a third party. Id. at 427-28, 426
P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. Mrs. Crisci had a policy with Security providing for $10,000
worth of coverage. Id. at 428, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. Although the plaintiff's
attorney in the previous case reduced his settlement demands from $400,000 to $9,000, and
although Mrs. Crisci offered to pay $2,500 of that amount, Security refused to settle, believing
the injuries were only worth $3,000. Id., 426 P.2d at 175-76, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16. Counsel
retained by Security, as well as Security's general claims manager, believed that a jury verdict
on the personal injury action could result in a verdict of not less than $100,000. Id. The
plaintiff in the previous suit was awarded $101,000, of which Security paid $10,000, the
amount of its policy. Id. at 428-29, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. Mrs. Crisci became
indigent in paying off the remaining amount. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at
16. Mrs. Crisci's physical and mental health also declined, and she made several suicide
attempts. Id. As a result of her action against Security, Mrs. Crisci was awarded $91,000 for
the insurance company's failure to settle, and $25,000 for emotional distress. Id. at 427, 426
P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
25. Id. at 430, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
28. Id. See infra notes 164-167 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of certain
lenders in entering into borrowing contracts).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979).
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faith and fair dealing. 2 The Egan court allowed the insured to recover
3
punitive damages for the insurer's breach of the implied covenant.
In Egan, the tortious conduct consisted of the insurer's failure to
properly investigate the plaintiff's insurance claim. 34 Egan thus expanded the scope of tort liability beyond that allowed in Comunale
or Crisci by holding that tort liability could be imposed not only for
wrongful refusal to accept a third party's reasonable settlement offer,
but also for failure to meet obligations imposed by the implied
covenant with respect to the insured. 35 In supporting this expansion
of the tort, the Egan court stressed that the insurer's duty to third
parties and to the insured "are merely two different aspects of the
same duty,' '36 requiring each party to the contract to refrain from
actions which would impair the right of the other to obtain the
benefits of the contract. 37 Benefits to the insured include protection
32. Id.
33. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 819, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487. In Egan, the plaintiff
purchased a health and disability insurance policy from Mutual, providing for lifetime benefits
in the event the plaintiff became totally disabled as a result of either an accident "independent
of sickness and other causes" or sickness of sufficient severity as to confine the plaintiff to
his home. Id. at 815, 598 P.2d at 454, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 484. Benefits for a nonconforming
illness were to be paid for no more than three months. Id. In 1970, after the plaintiff had
been compensated for three separate back-related injuries, he made a fourth claim for an
accidental back injury sustained in the course of employment. Id. This injury was compensated
under the policy's provisions for three months after the injury. Id. Plaintiff attempted to
extend the compensation for this injury beyond three months, stating that he was unable to
return to work and that he would submit to an examination by a doctor of Mutual's choice.
Id. Seven months after the accident, the plaintiff underwent back surgery. Id. at 816, 598
P.2d at 454, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 484. Doctors for the hospital where the surgery took place told
Mutual's field investigator that about 50% of the plaintiff's injuries were due to the natural
progression of a genetic defect in the plaintiff's spine. Id. at 816, 598 P.2d at 455, 157 Cal.
Rptr. at 485. The field investigator, after a review of the medical records, reclassified the
plaintiff's injury as a nonconforming illness, and one year after the injury issued the plaintiff
a check for medical costs and three months of disability payments. Id. The plaintiff testified
that the field investigator offered him a larger check if he would surrender his policy. Id. Two
years after the injury, the plaintiff received a 73 percent disability rating on his worker's
compensation claim. Id. The plaintiff, after further inaction by Mutual, sued Mutual and the
field investigators for compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that the defendant's failure
to have the plaintiff examined by a doctor of their choice, or to consult with his treating
physicians, violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id.
34. Id. at 817, 598 P.2d at 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
35. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 817-18, 598 P.2d at 455-56, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 485-86. Mutual
had argued that, in an insurance context, the implied covenant was violated only when the
insurer wrongfully refused to settle a claim while knowing it had no reasonable basis for doing
so. Id. See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text (discussing tort liability in Comunale
and Crisci for wrongful refusal to settle).
36. Id. (citing Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 572, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973)).
37. Id. (citing Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 940, 553 P.2d 1584, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 424, (1976); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198,
68 A.L.R.2d 883 (1958)).
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from calamity, as well as peace of mind and security. 8 Thus, the
Egan court concluded that the insurer must protect the insured's

interests in the contract by fully inquiring into the insured's claim,
and denying payments only after making a thorough, reasonable,
and good faith investigation of the claim.3 9

The Egan court awarded the plaintiff punitive damages pursuant
to California Civil Code section 3294, 40 the purpose of which is to
deter "acts deemed socially unacceptable and, consequently, to discourage the perpetuation of objectional corporate policies." ' 4' In the
insurance context, public policy supports punitive damages to further
this legislative purpose, since the Egan court found a special rela-

tionship between insurers and their insureds.42 This special relationship is the result of two factors: (1) insurers hold themselves out as
fiduciaries in fulfilling a vital "quasi-public" service and, as such,
assume an obligation to place the public's interest before their own
in maximizing gains and limiting disbursements; and (2) insurers and
insureds stand in an inherently unbalanced relationship, the adhesive
nature of which puts the insurers in the dominant bargaining position. 43 The concurrence of these two factors justified the imposition

of punitive damages as an appropriate attempt to restore balance in
the contractual relationship when the insurer was guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice. 44

38. Id. at 819, 598 P.2d at 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co.,
66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967)).
39. Id. at 819, 598 P.2d at 456-57, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87.
40. Civil Code section 3294 provides: "In an action for breach of an obligation not
arising from contract, where it has been proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in
addition to actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant." CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1990).
41. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487. The Egan court
found that Mutual of Omaha had acted with malice, intent to oppress, and conscious disregard
for the plaintiff's rights based on the following facts: Mutual's benefits department manager,
McEachen, accused the plaintiff of fraud for accepting the insurance benefits instead of
working, although McEachen was aware of the plaintiff's efforts to find work. Id. at 821,
598 P.2d at 458, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 488. Even worse, McEachen responded to the plaintiff's
concerns for money during the Christmas season by laughing, thereby reducing the plaintiff
to tears before his wife and child. Id.
42. Id. at 820, 598 P.2d at 458, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing Hirsch, Carpenter & Carpenter, Strict Liability: a Response to the Gruen.
berg-Silberg conflict Regarding Insurance Litigation Awards,7 Sw. U.L. REv. 310, 326 (1975);
Comment, Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.: The Expanding Use of Punitive Damages
in Breach of Insurance Contract Actions, 15 SAN DInGo L. R~v. 287, 298-301 (1978); Note,
Contracting for Punitive Damages: Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Company, 4
Loy. L.A.L. REv. 208, 219-24 (1971)). In Egan, Justice Clark vigorously dissented to the
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II.

BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH IN THE

EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT: Foley's Denial of Tort Remedies.

A.

The Pre-Foley Cases

After tort damages for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing were allowed in insurance cases, plaintiffs in
employment cases began seeking tort remedies, including punitive
damages, in cases involving wrongful discharge. 45 A California court
of appeals first allowed punitive damages for breach of the implied
covenant in an employment context in Cleary v. American Airlines.4
In Cleary, the plaintiff alleged that his discharge was a result of his
involvement in union activities.47 The Cleary court held that when
an employer discharges an employee for participation in union activities, public policy will allow the employee to bring a cause of action
sounding both in contract and in tort for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.4
The public policy rationale behind the Cleary court's holding that
termination of an employee for union activities gives rise to a tort
holding that punitive damages were justified. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 824, 598 P.2d at 460, 157
Cal. Rptr. at 490 (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Clark focused on five elements
in determining that punitive damages were improper: (1) an action for breach of the implied
covenant must be considered a contract action, and thus Civil Code section 3294 will not be
triggered to allow punitive damages; (2) because the plaintiff is made whole by the award of
compensatory damages, any award of punitive damages amounts to a windfall or unjust
enrichment for the plaintiff; (3) the deterrence provided by punitive damages against further
wrongs is marginal, because the risk of liability for compensatory damages is sufficient
deterrence; (4) by imposing punitive damages on the insurance company, the public punishes
itself because future premiums will reflect the imposition of punitive damages on the industry;
(5) case law holds that a mere breach of the implied covenant of good faith is insufficient to
justify an award of punitive damages. Id. at 825-28, 598 P.2d at 461-62, 157 Cal. Rptr. 49192 (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Clark found that the conduct by Mutual's
adjusters was not sufficiently egregious to warrant an award of punitive damages. Id. at 829,
598 P.2d at 463, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 493 (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting). Despite the
determination that punitive damages were proper in this case, the court determined that the
jury award was excessive as a matter of law. Id. at 824, 598 P.2d at 460, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
490. The court noted that the punitive damages award was more than 40 times larger than
the "not-insubstantial" compensatory damage award of $123,600. Id. Further, the award
represented two and one-half times Mutual's net income in 1973, the year in which the action
was commenced. Id.
45. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
46. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
47. Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 454, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
48. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
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cause of action for breach of the implied covenant was based on
Petermann v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters9 and Tameny

v. Atlantic Richfield Co.5 0 In Petermann, an employee sued in
contract for wrongful discharge after he was fired for refusing to
commit perjury at the request of his employer.-" The Petermann
court allowed the employee to sue in contract for wrongful termination, notwithstanding the fact that the employment relationship
52
was terminable at will.
In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the California Supreme Court
considered the case of an employee who was discharged for refusing
to commit an illegal act at his employer's request.

3

In Tameny, the

employee was allowed to bring a tort cause of action for wrongful
discharge, a violation of California common law. 4 In light of the
fact that wrongful discharge constitutes a tort in California, the
Tameny court did not consider the plaintiff's claim that the discharge

also constituted a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.5 5 The Tameny court did, however, note that there was
support from other jurisdictions for the theory that wrongful dis-

charge in violation of the implied covenant of good faith may sound
in tort as well as in contract.5 6 Cleary relied on this dictum from

49. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
50. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). See Cleary, 111 Cal. App.
3d at 454, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
51. Petermann v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 187-88, 344 P.2d
at 26.
52. Id., at 188, 344 P.2d at 27. The Petermann court recognized an exception to California
Labor Code section 2922, which provides: "An employment, having no specified term, may
be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other." Id. See CAL. LAB. CODE §
2922 (West 1989). According to the court, an exception to the at-will provision of section
2922 arises when an employee is discharged in contravention of public policy. Petermann, 174
Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27. The Petermann court defined public policy as "that
principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
injurious to the public or against the public good .... ." Id. (quoting Safeway Stores v. Retail
Clerks etc. Assn., 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (1953). The Cleary court thus used
the Petermann decision to support the right of an employee to sue his employer for wrongful
termination, despite the fact that the employment relationship is terminable at will. Cleary,
111 Cal. App. 3d at 450-51, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
53. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980).
54. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844 (citing Kouff v. BethlehemAlameda Shipyard, 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 324, 202 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1949); Glenn v. Clearmann's
Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 796-97, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769, 771 (1961); Wetherton
v. Growers Farm Labor Assn., 275 Cal. App. 2d 168, 174-75, 79 Cal. Rptr. 543, 546-47
(1969); Montvalo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 76, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405 (1970)).
55. Id. at 179 n.12, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.12.
56. Id. (citing Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E. 2d 1251, 1257
(1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549, 551-52 (1974)).
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Tameny, allowing the plaintiff in a wrongful discharge action to sue
in tort for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
57
dealing.
Having found support in Petermann and Tameny for a tort cause

of action arising out of a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith in the employment context, the Cleary court held that the

particular facts of the case demonstrated a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing after considering two factors.5 8 First, the plaintiff had satisfactorily been employed by the

defendant for over eighteen years.59 After such a length of time, the
Cleary court deemed the discharge of the plaintiff, without legal

cause, to be a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. 60 Second, the Cleary court considered the existence of
company regulations which regulated employee conduct and which
set forth the specific procedures for adjudicating employee disputes,
such as the one in controversy. 6' According to the Cleary court, the

existence of such a regulation demonstrated that the employer recognized its obligation to deal fairly and in good faith with all of its

employees. 62 The existence of these two factors were found to "operate as a form of estoppel" which precluded the employer from
discharging the employee for less than good cause. 63 As a result, the
57. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 445, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,
729 (1980).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. This covenant is implied in every contract. See Comunale v. Traders & General
Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). The implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, as noted above in the insurance context, obliges the employer to do nothing to
deprive the plaintiff of the benefits of the employment bargain. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at
455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. While a discharge for union participation would violate the
covenant, the Cleary court acknowledged that the employer may discharge an employee for
economic reasons if justified by "judicial balancing of the competing equities." Id. (citing
Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 335, 369 (1974)) (stating
that "[t]he conflict between an employee's right to job security and an employer's right to
fire for cause or with economic justification should be resolved by judicial balancing of the
competing equities."). See supra notes 20-43 and accompanying text (discussing the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance context).
61. Cleary, Ill Cal. App. 3d at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The plaintiff failed to include
the regulations in the complaint, thus foreclosing an opportunity to examine them. Id. at 447
n.2, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724 n.2. The plaintiff alleged that, although required to do so by the
regulations, the defendants did not afford him a fair, impartial, and objective hearing to
enable him to protest his discharge. Id. at 44748, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
62. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
63. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. It is interesting to note that the Cleary court found
the discharge of the plaintiff without "legal" cause, after 18 years of employment, to violate
the implied covenant, while the estoppel notion described by the court prohibited discharge
for less than "good" cause. Id. The Cleary court did not explain any distinction between
"legal cause" and "good cause." Id.
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plaintiff was allowed to sue in tort for discharge in violation of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 64

In relying on this estoppel notion to justify the imposition of tort

damages in the employment context for breach of the implied covenant, the Cleary court departed from the rationale established in
the insurance context.65 The Cleary court did not base the imposition
of a tort remedy for discharge in violation of the implied covenant
on the existence of a "special relationship," nor did the court contend
that employers perform a vital "quasi-public" service, or hold themselves as fiduciaries with respect to their employees. 6 6 The court did,

however, recognize that an employee in a wrongful discharge action
may bring a cause of action for tortious breach of the implied

covenant of good faith.6 7 Cleary, however, provided courts with little

guidance in determining the consistent application of tort damages

for a breach of the implied covenant.6 8 It was hoped that the

by
California Supreme Court would resolve the difficulties presented
69
Corp.
Data
Interactive
v.
Foley
in
decision
Cleary with their
64. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
65. See supra notes 20-44 and accompanying text (discussing tort recovery in the insurance
context for an insurer's breach of the implied covenant of good faith). While the Cleary court
did not analogize wrongful discharge to breach of an insurance contract, such an analogy was
made in Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1116, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127
(1984). Wallis found support for this extension in language from Seaman's Direct Buying
Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984)
which "intimated" that tort recovery was possible where the relationship at issue had "similar
characteristics" to those found in insurance contracts. Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1116, 207
Cal. Rptr. at 127. The Wallis court adopted a five factor test, based on the characteristics of
insurance cases, which is designed to show that an action in tort will lie in most employment
relationships. Id. at 1116 n.2, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 127 n.2. To impose tort liability, Wallis
requires the satisfaction of the following factors:
(I) the contract must be such that the parties are in inherently unequal bargaining
positions; (2) the motivation for entering the contract must be a nonprofit motivation,
i.e., to secure peace of mind, security, future protection; (3) ordinary contract
damages are not adequate, because (a) they do not require the party in the superior
position to account for its actions, and (b) they do not make the inferior party
"whole"; (4) one party is especially vulnerable because of the type of harm it may
suffer and of necessity places trust in the other party to perform; and (5) the other
party is aware of this vulnerability.
Id. at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129. After applying this test, the Wallis court found the
employment contract at issue was sufficiently similar to an insurance contract to allow the
imposition of tort remedies. Id. at 1119, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129. Where these factors have been
established, the dominant party has a duty to consider the interests of the other party before
its own. Id. at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
66. Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729
(1980).
67. Id.
68. Levine, Judicial Backpedaling: Putting the Brakes on California's Law of Wrongful
Termination, 20 PAC. L.J. 993, 1008 (1989).
69. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988); Levine, supra note 68, at
1009.
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B.

Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.

In Foley, the California Supreme Court disallowed tort remedies
to employees alleging discharge in violation of the implied covenant

of good faith. 70 In turning to a discussion of the Foley decision, this
Comment will focus on the application of Foley to the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing generally, and not focus
specifically on wrongful termination, in order to clarify issues which
will be developed in the following discussion of lender liability. 1 As
will be shown below, courts working with lender liability issues have
analogized to the Foley court's reasoning in denying borrowers tort
72
remedies for breach of the implied covenant.
Prior to the 1988 decision in Foley, a relationship sufficient to
justify the imposition of punitive damages for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing had been found to exist in
insurance, 7 employment,74 and banking cases. 75 Foley denied tort
recovery to the plaintiff in an employment case, leaving the dilemma
of adopting a remedy for wrongful discharge to the legislature. 76 In
so doing, the Foley court expressly disapproved of Cleary's allowance
of a tort cause of action for an employer's breach of the implied
covenant.

77

70. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 700, 765 P.2d 373, 401, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 239-40 (1988).
71. For a more detailed examination of the decision as it relates to wrongful discharge,
see Levine, supra note 68.
72. See infra notes 108-214 and accompanying text (discussing lender liability actions).
73. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text (discussing Egan v. Mutual of Omaha
and imposition of punitive damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the insurance context).
74. See supra notes 46-69 and accompanying text (discussing Cleary v. American Airlines
and imposition of punitive damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the employment context).
75. See infra notes 110-121 and accompanying text (discussing Commercial Cotton Co.
v. United CaliforniaBank and Barrett v. Bank of America regarding the imposition of punitive
damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the banking
context).
76. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 700, 765 P.2d 373, 401, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 239 (1988).
77. Id. at 700 n.42, 765 P.2d at 401 n.42, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 240 n.42. Though the Foley
decision mentions the test proposed by Wallis to determine the existence of a special relationship, the opinion does not expressly disapprove of that test as a means of determining the
existence of a special relationship between two parties. Id. at 691 n.29, 765 P.2d at 395 n.29,
254 Cal. Rptr. at 233 n.29.
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1. Facts of the Foley Decision
The plaintiff, Daniel Foley, began working for Interactive Data
Corporation (IDC) in 1976.78 Between the time he was hired, and
1983 when he was discharged, Foley's salary increased from $18,000
to over $56,000. 79 In that time he had received several bonuses,
awards, and superior performance evaluations.80 In January of 1983,
Foley met with his former supervisor and privately informed him
that his new supervisor, Robert Kuhne, was being investigated by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation for embezzling from Bank of
America, Kuhne's former employer. 8 ' Foley was told to forget about
such rumors.82 In March of that year, Kuhne had Foley transferred
from IDC's Los Angeles office to another division in Massachusetts.83
One week later, Kuhne met with Foley in84Massachusetts and gave
him the option of resigning or being fired.
2. The Foley Court's Treatment of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Although Foley's written agreement with IDC made no reference
to the grounds upon which he might be terminated, Foley alleged
that his supervisors orally assured him of job security so long as he
performed adequately.85 Additionally, Foley alleged that he reasonably believed that IDC's "Termination Guidelines," which set forth
a seven step pre-termination procedure, were applicable to him.86 The
breach
plaintiff alleged that the discharge thus constituted a tortious
87
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The Foley court concluded that the relationship existing in the
employment context is not sufficiently similar to that existing in the

78.

Id. at 663, 765 P.2d at 375, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213.

79. Id.
80.
81.
P.2d at
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. Two days before his discharge, Foley received a $6,762 merit bonus. Id.
Id. Kuhne later pleaded guilty to a felony count of embezzlement. Id. at 664 n.1, 765
375 n.1, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 213 n.l.
Id. at 664, 765 P.2d at 375, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14.
Id. at 664, 765 P.2d at 375-76, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
Id. The opinion does not state whether the plaintiff resigned or was discharged.
Id. at 664, 765 P.2d at 375, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
Id. at 664, 765 P.2d at 375, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
Id. at 682-83, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
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insurance context to justify tort remedies.88 In reaching its conclusion,
the Foley court expressly disapproved of the holding in Cleary

allowing for imposition of tort damages for an employer's breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.8 9 The Foley
court disapproved of Cleary for two reasonsP ° First, although Cleary

relied on decisions from the insurance context in arguing that tort
and contract damages were appropriate for breach of the implied

covenant in an employment relationship, the Cleary court did not
compare the employment context to the insurance context to determine whether the relationships were sufficiently analogous to warrant

expansion of tort damages to employment cases. 91 Second, the Foley
court stated that Cleary relied too heavily on the Tameny 92 dictum

which suggested the possibility of tort remedies for an employer's
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 93 The

dictum in Tameny was based on insurance cases from California and
two out-of-state employment cases. 94 Neither of the out-of-state employment cases permitted tort damages to the plaintiff. 9 According
to the Foley court, the imposition of tort remedies in insurance cases

represented a "major departure" from traditional principles of contract law, and great care must, therefore, be exercised to ensure that
any extension of the tort of breach of the implied covenant is
96
appropriate.
88. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35. As will be discussed below,
the Foley court also determined that there is no special relationship existing between employer
and employee. See infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text (considering the Foley court's
discussion of the relationship existing between employer and employee).
89. See supra notes 46-69 and accompanying text (discussing Cleary and tortious breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment context). The
plaintiff in Foley relied on the Cleary holding in asserting that the California Supreme Court
should recognize tort remedies for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing occurring in an employment termination. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 682-83, 765 P.2d at
389, 254 Cal. Rprt. at 227.
90. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 687, 765 P.2d at 392, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
91. Id. at 685, 765 P.2d at 390, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29. Tort damages for breach of
the implied covenant in the insurance context were affirmed by the Foley court. Id.
92. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 179 n.12, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337
n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 846 n.12 (1980). See supra notes 53-56 discussing Tameny).
93. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 685-86, 765 P.2d at 391, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 686, 765 P.2d at 391, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 229. One of the out of state cases
upon which the Tameny dictum was based was Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130,
316 A.2d 549 (1974). In Monge, the court permitted an action for wrongful discharge, but
limited the plaintiff's recovery to contract damages. Monge, 316 A.2d at 551-52. The second
case, Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977), allowed
a cause of action to be sustained for breach of the implied covenant; however, the plaintiff's
recovery was limited to benefits already earned under the contract. Fortune v. Nat'l Cash
Register Co., 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
96. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 690, 765 P.2d at 394, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
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The Foley court denied the imposition of tort remedies for discharge in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing on two separate grounds. First, the court considered the
"special relationship" test and its applicability to the employment
relationship. 97 After considering several commentators' discussions of
the usefulness of the special relationship test, the court determined
that there is not a special relationship existing in the usual 98 employment relationship.99 In determining that the relationship existing
between employer and employee is not a "special relationship," 100

the court reasoned that: (1) the employee who suffers an employer's
breach is not put in the same economic dilemma as an insured faced
with an insurer's breach because the insured, unlike the employee,
cannot turn to the marketplace to cover the loss already sustained, 0'
(2) the employer does not provide a "quasi-public" service as does
the insurer, who contracts with insureds for the purpose of protecting

them from economic harm, 0 2 (3) the employee is seeking the same
kind of financial security as a person entering a typical commercial
contract where contract law governs, and (4) the insurer and insured
are at financial odds as a result of the insurer wanting to maintain

97. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 690-93, 765 P.2d at 394-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232-34. The special
relationship test was discussed in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha, 24 Cal. 3d 809, 157 Cal. Rptr.
482, 598 P.2d 452 (1979). See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text (discussing Egan).
93. The Foley court did not define the "usual" employment relationship.
99. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 690-93, 765 P.2d at 394-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232-24. See, e.g.,
Louderback & Jurika, Standardsfor Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16
U.S.F. L. REv. 187, 227 (1982) (stating that tort remedies for bad faith breach of contract
should only be applied to commercial contracts if the following features characteristic of
insurance bad faith actions are present: (1)one of the parties to the contract is in a superior
bargaining position and is able to dictate the terms of the contract; (2) the weaker party enters
the contract to secure an essential service or product, financial security or peace of mind, not
for profit; (3) the weaker party places its trust and confidence in the stronger; and (4) the
defendant's conduct indicates an intent to frustrate the weaker party's enjoyment of the
contract rights); Putz & Klippen, CommercialBad Faith:Attorney Fees-Not Tort LiabilityIs the Remedy for Stonewalling, 21 U.S.F. L. Rav. 419, 480 (1987) (stating that although the
"special relationship" test is purported to extend the tort of bad faith beyond insurance and
employment only slightly, the test may clear the way for pleading a tort cause of action for
nearly every breach of contract, creating a jury question as to whether or not the parties had
a "special relationship"); Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CAtu. L. REv. 1291, 1299-1301 (1986) (stating that the
special relationship test fails because (1) the test does not explain why tort liability is justified
for otherwise legal conduct, or for conduct which may give rise only to contract damages; (2)
the test is inadequate as a definition for the scope and application of the tort duty of good
faith and fair dealing; (3) the test does not differentiate between breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing and bad faith breach of contract; and (4) the test provides no
justification for imposing punitive damages and may thus unfairly chill legitimate conduct).
100. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 692-93, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
101. Id. at 692, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
102. Id.
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resources and the insured expecting to be compensated for his losses. 103
Second, after noting that there is not a special relationship between
employer and employee, the Foley court denied tort recovery to the
employee because the employment context is not sufficiently similar
4
to the insurance context to justify the imposition of tort remedies.'0
The court stated three factors that set the employment context apart
from the insurance context: (1) the countervailing concerns about
economic policy and stability; (2) the traditional separation of tort
and contract law; and (3) the numerous protections against improper
terminations already afforded employees. 01 5
Clearly, then, Foley places restrictions on the imposition of tort
damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. As mentioned above, Foley disallowed tort recovery in the
employment context for two reasons: lack of a special relationship
between the employer and employee, and lack of sufficient similarity
between the employment context and the insurance context.0 6 Because

the Foley court emphasized that test as the means of determining
whether tort damages should be extended beyond the insurance

context, this Comment will use the "sufficient similarity" test in
determining the appropriateness of extending tort damages for breach
07
of the implied covenant to the lender/borrower context.

103. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
104. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
105. Id. See infra notes 136-201 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of
these factors to the lender/borrower context).
106. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 163-188 and accompanying text (applying the special relationship test
to determine liability in the lender/borrower context). The Foley court stated "[w]e therefore
conclude that the employment relationship is not sufficiently similar to that of insurer and
insured to warrant judicial extension of the proposed additional tort remedies .

. . ."

Foley,

47 Cal. 3d at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35. On the other hand, the Foley
court stated that even assuming the appropriateness of the special relationship model for
determining whether to expand tort recovery, the employment relationship is not a special
relationship. Id. at 692, 765 P.2d at 395-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234. That the Foley court did
not consider the special relationship test as the sole criterion for extension of tort remedies
for breach of the implied covenant is further demonstrated by the commentaries cited by the
court exposing the frailties of the special relationship test. See supra note 99 (discussing the
commentaries cited by the Foley court in determining the inappropriateness of using the special
relationship test as a model for determining the appropriateness of tort remedies for breach
of the implied covenant in the employment context). This is not to say, however, that the
special relationship test is of no use in determining the appropriateness of extending tort
remedies for breach of the implied covenant to the lending context. The special relationship
test is a factor which will be considered in ascertaining whether a substantial similarity exists
between the insurance and lending contexts during the discussion of the traditional separation
of tort and contract. See infra notes 161-188 and accompanying text (applying the special
relationship test in determining the appropriateness of extension of tort remedies to the lender/
borrower context).
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III.

THE LENDER/BORROWER CONTEXT

In turning now to a discussion of the lender/borrower context,
this Comment will consider the 'history of lender liability cases, and
then analyze the imposition of tort damages on lenders for breach

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing after Foley.
Contrary to the holdings of some California appellate courts,103 this
Comment proposes that tort damages, including punitive damages,

may be imposed on lenders for some breaches of the implied covenant. The appropriateness of tort damages will depend on a showing

of substantial similarity between the lending and insurance contexts,
as dictated by the factors set forth in Foley.1' 9
A.

History of Lender Liability
The history of tortious breach of the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing in the lending context began with a case arising
from an action brought by a depositor, Commercial Cotton Co. v.

United CaliforniaBank.110 In Commercial Cotton, a bank depositor

was awarded punitive damages for the bank's tortious breach of the

implied covenant.' The Fourth District Court of Appeals found that
the bank's use of spurious, unjustified legal defenses in an effort to
prevent an innocent depositor from recovering funds lost through
the bank's negligence violated the implied covenant.1 2 To justify the

108. See Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1989);
Mitsui Manufacturers Bank v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. App. 3d 726, 260 Cal. Rptr. 793
(1989).
109. See infra notes 133-214 and accompanying text (applying the Foley factors to determine
that there is a substantial similarity between the lending and insurance contexts).
110. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
111. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 514, 209
Cal. Rptr. at 552.
112. Id. at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554. In Commercial Cotton, four years after the checks
from Commercial Cotton's account with United California Bank (UCB) were reported missing
and replaced with checks of a different color and number series, one of the missing checks
bearing unauthorized signatures was negligently paid by UCB for $4,000. Id. at 514, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 553. Two years later, when Commercial Cotton noticed the error and reported it to
UCB, the bank admitted it had erred but refused to pay, stating that the claim was barred
by a one year statute of limitations. However, only eleven days before, the California Supreme
Court, in a case directly involving UCB, held that a three year statute of limitations applies
when a customer sues a bank alleging negligence. Id. at 515, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 553. See Sun
'N Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 699, 582 P.2d 920, 939, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 329, 348 (1978). The Commercial Cotton court found that UCB must have been aware
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award of tort damages in the bank/depositor relationship, the court
in Commercial Cotton analogized to the special relationship found

to exist between insurers and insureds in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha."3

The Commercial Cotton court found that insurance and banking

have much in common because they are both highly regulated and
both perform "vital public services substantially affecting the public

welfare. ' " 4 This commonality formed the basis for finding the
11 5
relationship of bank to depositors to be at least "quasi-fiduciary."
Where such a relationship exists, the court concluded, tort recovery

for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
proper."16

The extension of tort liability to the lender/borrower relationship
was made in Barrett v. Bank of America." 7 In Barrett, the plaintiff
requested jury instructions on constructive fraud." 8 Constructive
fraud usually arises from a breach of duty when a relation of trust
and confidence exists." 9 In considering whether such instructions

of the decision regarding the statute of limitations and, thus, UCB's "hard line" in attempting
to avoid reimbursement to Commercial Cotton Co. constituted unjustifiable stonewalling.
Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
113. Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554. See supra notes
32-44 (discussing Egan). By analogizing to the insurance context, the Commercial Cotton court
took a different tack than the Cleary court took in the employment context. See supra notes
58-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Cleary court's determination that tort damages
for an employer's breach of the implied covenant of good faith was based on a form of
estoppel).
114. Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
115. Id.
Finding the quasi-fiduciary relationship in Commercial Cotton was a significant departure
from prior law. See Morse v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 142 Cal. App. 3d 228, 232 (1983) (stating
that it is obvious that the relationship created by a deposit id that of debtor-creditor, and not
a fiduciary relationship); Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 390
N.E.2d 320, 323 (1979) (stating that unless the parties understand that a special trust or
confidence has been reposed, the relationship of a debtor and creditor is not a fiduciary
relationship; Bank of Main v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101 (1966) (finding that the bank and
depositor have a relationship founded upon contract"). See also Comment, Commercial Cotton
Co. v. United California Bank: California's Newest Extension of Bad Faith Litigation into
Commercial Law, 16 Sw. L.J. 645, 681 (1986) (stating that the "quasi-fiduciary" bankdepositor relationship is an inadequate foundation for extending tort damages for breach of
the implied covenant good faith into a new area of commercial law).
116. Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
117. 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1986).
118. Barrett v. Bank of America, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1366, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
119. Id. (citing Darrow v. Robert A. Klein & Co., Inc., 111 Cal. App. 310, 315-16, 295
P. 566, 568 (1931)). Confidential and fiduciary relations are synonymous. Id. at 1369, 229
Cal. Rptr. at 20 (citing Estate of Cover, 188 Cal. 133, 143, 204 P. 583, 588 (1922)). The
Barrett court noted that the relationship between bank and depositor is at least "quasifiduciary." Id. at 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 20 (citing Commercial Cotton Co. v. United
California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (1985)). The Barrett
court also noted that "other jurisdictions recognize a similar relationship of trust and confidence
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were appropriate, the Barrett court looked at the nature of the

relationship existing between Barrett and Bank of America.

20

The

court found substantial evidence to support the existence of a rela-

tionship of trust and confidence between the plaintiff and Bank of
America, and thus granted the plaintiff's request for jury instructions
2
on constructive fraud.1 '
In 1989, California appellate courts considered two cases involving
claims of tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing in the lender/borrower context: Price v. Wells Fargo
Bank'2 and Mitsui Manufacturers Bank v. Superior Court of San

exists between a bank and its loan customers which gives rise to a duty of disclosure of facts
which may place the bank or a third party at an advantage with respect to the customer."
Id. (citing Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 196 N.W.2d 619, (1972); First
Nat'l Bank in Lenox v. Brown 181 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970); Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank
49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937)).
120. Id. at 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
121. Id. at 1369-70, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21. The court held the following facts supported
the constructive fraud theory: Barrett perceived his relationship with Bank of America's loan
officer (Chaffee) as very close; Barrett relied on Chaffee for financial advice and advice on
the business merger which led to the controversy; Barrett confided information concerning
confidential and unfavorable business developments with Chaffee; Chaffee told Barrett that
merging Barrett's corporation with another would release Barrett's personal guarantees for
loans with Bank of America; Chaffee told a consultant for the company Barrett was considering
merging with that a merger would not result in release of Barretts' guarantees; Barrett did not
find out about this conversation until three years after the merger was finalized; and finally,
Bank of America stood to benefit from the merger. Id. at 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
122. 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1989). In Price, Ernest and Maxine Price
approached Wells Fargo requesting a five year loan. Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal.
App. 3d at 471, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 736. On February 28, 1983, Wells Fargo extended three
loans to the Prices with a combined value of $370,000. Id. Contrary to the Prices' request for
a five year loan, Wells Fargo made the loans payable on October 31, 1983, eight months after
they were extended. Id. The Prices were surprised to learn of the October 31, 1983, maturity
date and notified Wells Fargo that they would not be able to meet the payment schedule. Id.
at 472, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 737. According to Maxine Price, Wells Fargo agreed to reschedule
the loans on the five year plan as originally contemplated. Id. After several attempts to make
accommodations on the payment schedule with Wells Fargo, Ernest Price received an assurance
from Wells Fargo that the loan schedule would be reorganized. Id. The case does not describe
the terms of this alleged agreement. Id. With this agreement, the Prices let the October 31
date pass without making any payments towards the principal of the loans. Id. After the
October 31 date passed, the Prices began receiving letters announcing that their loans were
past due. Id. The Prices conceded that their loans were due, and made further attempts to
initiate discussions to restructure the loans. Id. In March of 1984, the parties agreed upon a
new repayment schedule requiring a final payment to be made in March of 1985. Id. at 47273, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 737. The Prices could not meet this revised payment schedule and, again,
fell behind in their payments. Id. at 473, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 737. In September of 1984, Wells
Fargo filed a notice of default and initiated foreclosure proceedings. Id. at 473, 261 Cal. Rptr.
at 738. After negotiating with the Prices' attorney, the defendant issued a modified ultimatum
on February 19, 1985, which stated that the bank would forbear on publishing notice of
trustee's sale on condition that the Prices agreed, inter alia, to make a payment of $50,000
on February 20, 1985, and pay all amounts due by June 10, 1985. Id. On March 1, 1985, the
Prices paid $50,000. Id. at 474, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 738. The Prices made a further payment of
$90,000 on June 10, 1985. Id. Despite this effort by the Prices, Wells Fargo published a notice
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Diego. 23 Each case held that the relationship existing between the

lender and borrower was not sufficiently similar to the fiduciary
relationship existing between an insurer and insured to warrant tort

recovery for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.' 24 In reaching this conclusion, both courts interpreted the
holding in Foley as precluding tort recovery for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in commercial contracts.1 25
In interpreting Foley to preclude tort recovery by borrowers for

breach of the implied covenant, both the Price and Mitsui courts
refused to follow Commercial Cotton and find a tortious breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the lender/
borrower context. 126 The Price court criticized both Commercial
Cotton and Barrett for basing tort liability for breach of the implied
covenant upon a quasi-fiduciary relationship between bank and customer, finding the existence of such a quasi-fiduciary relationship to
be "inconsistent with past authority and current trends in the law."' 27
The Mitsui court, on the other hand, found that Commercial Cotton
did not concern the relationship between lender and borrower because

of trustee's sale to be held on July 9, 1985. Id. On June 28, 1985, the Prices paid the balance
owing on all three loans with money borrowed from two friends. Id. In July of 1985, the
Prices filed an action in the Superior Court of Merced County, stating five causes of action:
fraud, tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, contractual breach of
the covenant of good faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Id. at 470, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 736. The trial court granted Wells Fargo's
motion for summary judgment on all issues. Id.
123. 212 Cal. App. 3d 726, 260 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1989). In Mitsui, the defendant borrower,
Squidco, borrowed approximately $1,650,000 in short-term loans from Mitsui, with the
understanding of both parties that long-term loans would replace the short-term loans. Mitsui
Manufac. Bank v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 728, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 794. The shortterm loans were occasionally renewed while Squidco unsuccessfully searched for long-term
financing. Id. Eventually, Squidco defaulted on all the Mitsui loans and rejected Mitsui's
proposal for long-term financing. When Mitsui's demand for full payment went unanswered,
Mitsui sued for payment due, enforcement of the continuing guaranties, and foreclosure of
the security interest. Id. Squidco cross-complained alleging that Mitsui tortiously breached the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by (1) reneging on an alleged oral promise to renew
Squidco's short-term credit until Squidco obtained long term financing, and (2) by reneging
on an oral promise to provide long-term financing without requiring a blanket deed of trust.
Id. at 728-29, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 794. Mitsui moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that the ordinary arms-length commercial lender/borrower relationship was insufficient, as a
matter of law, to justify tort damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Id. at 729, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 794. This motion was denied in the trial court. Id.
124. Price, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 741; Mitsui, 212 Cal. App. 3d at
732-33, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
125. Price, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 741; Mitsui, 212 Cal. App. 3d at
731, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
126. Price, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 741; Mitsui, 212 Cal. App. 3d at
731, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 796. See supra notes 110-116 and accompanying text (discussing
Commercial Cotton in greater detail).
127. Price, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 476, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 740.
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Commercial Cotton "was based upon a bank's reimbursing a depos-

'1
itor for monies it had negligently disbursed."'

While both Price and Mitsui denied plaintiffs recovery for tortious
breach of the implied covenant of good faith, Price took a stronger

approach in holding that the Foley decision "surely precludes" use
29
of a "quasi-fiduciary" relationship as a basis for tort recovery.
The Mitsui court, by contrast, held that the facts of the case before

it established only a breach of contract action, insufficient to establish
a fiduciary relationship that would justify tort recovery. 30 Mitsui
was, therefore, similar to Barrett in that both looked to the factual
nature of the relationship to determine whether any fiduciary obligations exist.' 3' The question then is whether a fact situation may
arise in which tort damages will be appropriate for a lender's breach
of the implied covenant of good faith. As will be argued below, the
facts of the relationship between lender and borrower will determine
whether the lender will be able to sue in tort for breach of the
32
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

B. Justifying Tort Damages on Lender's Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith: The Substantial Similarity Test
In Foley, the California Supreme Court held that the usual employment relationship did not warrant extension of tort remedies for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 3 To
reach its decision, the court compared the employment context to
the insurance context. 34 The Foley court based its comparison on

128. Mitsui, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 731, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
129. Price, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 741.
130. Mitsui, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 731-32, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 796-97. According to the Mitsui
court, the six factors to consider in deciding whether to impose tort damages for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are whether: (1) the contract is the product
of the unequal bargaining strength of the parties; (2) ordinary contract damages are adequate;
(3) adverse impact on the damaged party results from the adhesiveness of contract provisions
which are neutral or beneficial to the other party; (4) there is public concern over the manner
in which the parties to the contract conduct themselves; (5) the reasonable expectations of the
parties have been violated; and (6) there was a fiduciary relationship in which the damaged
party entrusted financial dependence or personal security to the other. Id. Squidco had cited
no fact that would remove the transaction at issue from the ordinary commercial context. Id.
131. See Barrett v. Bank of America, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16,
20-21 (1986); Mitsui, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 731-32, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 796-97.
132. See infra notes 133-201 and accompanying text.
133. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 692, 765 P.2d 373, 234, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 394 (1988).
134. Id.
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three factors: (1) concerns about economic policy and stability, (2)
the traditional separation of tort and contract law, and (3) the
numerous protections against improper terminations already afforded
employees. 3 5 Each of these three factors will now be analyzed in the
lender/borrower context to determine the fact situations under which
a breach of the implied covenant should give rise to tort damages.
1.

Concerns About Economic Policy and Stability

The Foley court described the need for predictability in employment
contracts as important to commercial stability. 36 In the employment
context, stability is enhanced by the predictable damages available in
a breach of contract action,1 37 and by allowing employers discretion
to dismiss employees without subjecting themselves to tort litigation."'3 8
Because Foley continues to allow tort recovery for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance
context, tort recovery in the insurance context must not be so
disruptive of economic stability as to make tort damages inappropriate. As applied to the lender/borrower context, the issue becomes
whether allowing borrowers to recover in tort when a bank breaches

135. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35 (1988).
136. Id. at 696, 765 P.2d at 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
137. Id. 696 n.33, 765 P.2d at 398 n.33, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 237 n.33. In support of its
contention that tort damages in the employment context are disruptive of economic stability,
the Foley court cites commentaries which suggest continued application of tort damages in
wrongful discharge actions could have deleterious effects. Id. at 695-96, 795 P.2d at 397-98,
254 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37. One such commentator observed that rapidly rising jury awards is
of concern to the business community, as such awards often exceed settlement demands by as
much as 187 percent. Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbitration
13 Ehip. REL. L.J. 404, 405-406 (1988). Excessive jury awards in wrongful termination actions
also threaten the prerogative of management in controlling the workplace and retaining only
the most qualified employees, and restrict firms' ability to meet changing economic conditions
flexibly. Note, ProtectingAt Will Employees, 93 HAxv. L. REv. 1816, 1834-35 (1979).
138. Id. at 696, 765 P.2d at 398-99, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 237. See also Putz & Klippen,
Commercial Bad Faith:Attorney Fees-Not Tort Liability-Is the Remedy for "Stonewalling",
21 U.S.F. L. Rv.419, 430 (1987). Putz and Klippen discuss Posner's theory that economic
stability is increased by limiting wrongful discharge awards to the amount due under the
contract because the employer may then determine the most efficient allocation of resources.
Id.
[Posner's] analysis evolves from the central notion that when the benefit to the
breaching party exceeds the detriment to the nonbreaching party, breach of contract
is economically more efficient than performance. Breach, in these instances, promotes
the efficient allocation of resources and benefits society as a whole. The obvious
corollary of this premise is that when the injured party's losses exceed the breaching
party's gains, breach is economically inefficient and society loses.
Id. at 430-31 (citing R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYsIs OF THE LAW (3d. ed. 1986)).

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 22

the implied covenant would be so disruptive of economic stability as
to make tort damages an inappropriate remedy for the breach.
Phrased another way, the question is whether economic policy and
stability will be compromised to an even greater extent than already

allowed by the insurance decisions if wronged borrowers are allowed
to recover in tort when a bank engages in conduct that impairs the
right of the borrower to enjoy the benefits of the contract. 3 9 Such

impairment may occur, for example, when a bank takes a "hard
line" in repayment negotiations.' 40 Contract damages are not primarily designed to prevent banks from engaging in such practices. 14
Rather, they are designed to redress the breach by awarding the

plaintiff the benefit of the bargain, putting the plaintiff in the position
he would have been in had the contract not been entered into, or
requiring the breaching party to disgorge the benefit obtained through
142
the contract to the injured party.

Banks are important to economic stability. Indeed, should bank
profitability decline, general monetary policy and economic stability
will be seriously affected.' 3 While there is a concern for the stability
and economic soundness of banks, there is also a need to protect
the public against imprudent banking.' 44 The issue is whether tort

damages, including punitive damages, so adversely affect the economic stability of the banking industry as to make such damages an
inappropriate measure to protect the public. An exact analysis of the
effect tort damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
may have upon the banking industry is ,beyond the scope of this

Comment. However, the position advanced by this Comment is that

139. The test determining that one party violates the implied covenant of good faith when
that party impairs the right of the other party in obtaining the benefits of the contract is
derived from Egan v. Mutual of Omaha. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text
(discussing Egan and breach of the implied covenant of good faith in the insurance context).
140. See Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 479, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 742
(1989) (plaintiffs alleged that Wells Fargo breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
by taking a "hard line" in repayment negotiations).
141. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, 812-14 (1982). Farnsworth refers to these three types of
remedies as "expectation interest," "reliance interest," and "restitution interest." Id.
142. Id.
143. Isaac & Fein, Facing the Future-Life Without Glass Steagall, 37 CATH. U.L. REV.
281, 297 n.75 (1988) (citing Structure and Regulation of FinancialFirms and Holding Companies:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) at 121-22) (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System); FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEw YORK, RECENT TRENDS IN
COMMERCAL BANK PROFITABIrITY: A STAFF STuDY at 1 (1986).
144. Keley ex rel. Slay v. Michigan Nat'l. Bank, 377 Mich. 481, 141 N.W.2d 73, 80 n.l,
(1966) (Adams, J., concurring) (citing Moran v. State Banking Comm'r, 322 Mich. 230, 243,
33 NA.2d 772, 778 (1948).
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the imposition of tort damages in the lending context is consistent
with the policy allowing for the imposition of tort damages in the
insurance context.
In the insurance context, tort damages, including punitive damages,
are permitted in an effort to prevent the insurer from breaching its
duties to the insured. 45 Such "leverage" on insurers is consistent
with public policy demands placed on insurers as entities occupying
superior bargaining positions over their insured. 46 In the lender/
borrower context, this disparity in bargaining positions is often
reflected in adhesion contracts, which borrowers must enter into in
order to obtain a loan. 47 This disparity in bargaining positions is
further reflected by the practical inability of many borrowers to
obtain funds in the face of a lender's breach. 48 In obtaining a loan,
borrowers usually post some form of security with the lender. When
the lender breaches the implied covenant, the borrower may be left
without funds to cover the loan payments, and, because the borrower
has no security to cover another loan, may suffer foreclosure on the
posted security. 49 Similarly, in the insurance context, when an insurer
breaches, the insurer cannot obtain indemnity from another insurer
for the loss already incurred. 50 The positions borrowers and insureds
find themselves in after a breach, however, is markedly different
from that of an employee who is wrongfully discharged: the employee
can mitigate his damages by turning to the marketplace for alternative
5
employment. '
The insurance and banking contexts are thus similar in that the
weaker party necessarily depends upon the stronger to fulfill its
obligations. A breach in such a situation can have devastating and
145. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157
Cal. Rptr. 482, 487-88 (1979) (citing Hirsch, Strict Liability: A Response to the GruenbergSilberg Conflict Regarding Insurance Litigation Awards, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 310, 326 (1975)).
146. Id.
147. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text (discussing adhesion contracts as an
element of the special relationship existing between insurer and insured).
148. See Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 474, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 738
(1989) (borrower was forced to borrow money from friends to pay off outstanding loans).
149. See Mitsui Manufacturers Bank v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. App. 3d 726, 728, 260
Cal. Rptr. 793, 794 (1989) (breach by the lender resulted in foreclosure on the borrower's
security).
150. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 692, 765 P.2d 373, 396, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 234 (1988).
151. Id. But see id. at 718, 765 P.2d at 415, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 253 (Kaufman, J., dissenting)
(Justice Kaufman's dissent argued that the majority was naive in its determination that
discharged employees may turn to the marketplace to mitigate their losses: "What market is
there for the factory worker laid off after 25 years of labor in the same plant, or for the
middle-aged executive fired after 25 years with the same firm?").
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uncoverable consequences to the weaker party. Therefore, because in
both contexts the weaker parties are similarly affected by a breach,
and because public policy has allowed the imposition of tort damages
in the insurance context as an effort to "restore balance to the
contractual relationship,' 152 a similar allowance of tort damages in
the lender context is warranted to restore balance to that relationship.
It is important to note, however, that tort damages are only appropriate where the relationship between lender and borrower is unbalanced-economically powerful borrowers may not require tort damages
to restore balance to the contractual relationship. Imposition of tort
damages in the lender/borrower context, depending on the circumstances of the relationship, may be consistent with the public policy
supporting tort damages in the insurance context. Unless future
experience reveals that tort damages in the lending context are more
disruptive of the economy than the imposition of tort damages in
the insurance context, the "economic policy and stability" factor
proposed in Foley should be deemed satisfied in the lending context
where the bargaining strength of the parties is unbalanced.
2.

TraditionalSeparation of Tort and Contract Law

Damages in breach of contract actions are limited to the amount
that will compensate the plaintiff for the harm proximately caused
by the breach, or which would naturally result from the breach. 3
In a contract action, the plaintiff may not recover damages for
emotional distress, 154 nor may he recover punitive damages.'55 Indeed,
152. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157
Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979).

153. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (Vest 1970).
154. See, e.g., Westwater v. Grace Church, 140 Cal. 339, 342, 73 P. 1055, 1057 (1903).
See also 5 A. CoaRiN , CONTRACTS § 1076 (1960); C. McCoRMCK, HANDBOOK ON THM LAw
OF DAMAGES § 145 (1935); 11 S. WfLnSTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1341
(3d ed. 1961); Comment, Recovery of Mental Anguish for Breach of Contract: The need for

an Enabling Statute, 5 CAL. W.L. REv. 88 (1968) (arguing that while early common law did
not allow damages for mental distress arising out of a breach of contract, today such awards
are possible, although difficult to determine). Exceptions to this rule can be found when the
primary purpose of the contract is to assure the promisee's peace of mind, for example in
funeral arrangements. See, e.g., Chelin v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 481-82, 196 P.2d 915, 916
(1948).
155. See 5 A. CoREN, CONTRACTS § 1077 (1960); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach
of Contract, 70 CoLum. L. REv. 1145, 1146 (1970); Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages:
Toward a PrincipledApproach, 31 HASTINGs L.J. 639, 658 (1980); Simpson, Punitive Damages
For Breach of Contract, 20 OHio ST. L.J. 284, 284 (1959); Sullivan, Punitive Damages for
Breach of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207,
207 (1977); Comment, Exemplary Damages in Contract Cases, 7 W.LAiMETTrE L. REV. 137,
138 (1971); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1345 (1933).
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the theories behind contract remedies are largely unconcerned with
whether the breach occurred in good or bad faith. 5 6 Tort remedy
theories, by contrast, seek to compensate the injured party for the
injury sustained, and additionally seek to deter future actions that
cause such injury. 57 Tort remedies are, thus, not limited to compensation for economic harm, but may extend to damages for emotional
distress551 and, when malice or oppression is shown, punitive dam-

ages. 159
Because of the traditional separation of tort and contract law,

assessment of damages in a given dispute is, in theory, very simple:
the court assesses tort damages for tortious conduct, and contract

damages for breach of contract. The implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing was developed in the contract "arena. '' 6° Thus, to

assess tort damages in what is fundamentally a contract action is not
in keeping with tradition. Nonetheless, tort damages for breach of
the implied covenant in the insurance context were approved in

Egan.'6' Consequently, in determining whether tort damages should
also be applied in a lender/borrower context, the reasoning behind

Egan must be analyzed. The Foley court noted that in addition to
satisfying the Egan requirements before tort remedies may be granted

for a breach of the implied covenant, there must be some rule
assuring that only "deserving" cases of breach of the implied cove1 62
nant receive tort relief.
Egan found a special relationship on which to base tort liability
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as

a result of two factors: (1) insurers hold themselves out as fiduciaries
in fulfilling a vital "quasi-public" service; and (2) insurer and insured
stand in an inherently unbalanced, adhesive relationship. 63 The issue
156. Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If At All, Should It Be
Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 425, 434 (1981).
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1977).
158.

See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 905(b).

159. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908.
160. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 683, 765 P.2d 373, 389, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 227 (1988). See also Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369, 371 (1980) (stating that the good faith doctrine
is employed by courts for the purpose of effectuating the parties intentions, or protecting their
reasonable expectations).
161. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text (discussing Egan's extension of tort
damages for breach of the implied covenant).
162. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 697, 765 P.2d at 399, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 237. See infra notes
199-201 and accompanying text (discussing the formulation of a rule that assures only deserving
breaches of the implied covenant are given tort recovery in the lender/borrower context).
163. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157
Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979).

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 22

here is whether the lender/borrower relationship is sufficiently similar
to that of insurer/insured to be termed a "special relationship" such
that tort liability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is appropriate.' 64
a. Vital "Quasi-Public" Service
According to Egan, an activity performs a "vital quasi-public
service" if it is "affected with a public interest.' ' 65 The beneficiary
of an insurance contract does not seek commercial gain by entering
the contract, but rather seeks the protection insurance provides
against calamity-specifically, a source of income when, due to
disability, the insured is unable to work. 166 As insurers are well aware,
the purchase of insurance provides the insured with peace of mind
and security concerning a need basic to the insured's economic
survival. 67 While borrowers do not seek protection from calamity
when entering into a loan agreement, in many cases the borrower
desires funds to obtain a home or business. 68 In these situations, the
borrower is not seeking commercial advantage, but rather the procurement of necessities basic to survival: home and income. Because
a breach by the lender in such situations can result in foreclosure on
the home or business, the effect may be no less a calamity than
would occur if an insurer had breached his obligations to an insured.
In such narrow circumstances, it seems consistent with the rationale
of Egan to describe the lender as a purveyor of a quasi-public service.
Insurers assume the responsibilities of, and hold themselves out
as, fiduciaries when providing the "vital quasi-public" service. 69 This
is so because they are obliged to go beyond meeting the reasonable
expectations of coverage, putting the insured's interest before their
own when necessary.1 70 A fiduciary has been defined as a person
164.

See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of a "special

relationship").
165.

Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487.

166.

Id.

167.
168.

Id.
See Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 471, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 736

(1989) (plaintiffs borrowed funds to pay off existing loans on cattle ranch); Barrett v. Bank
of America, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 1365, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16, 17 (1986) (plaintiffs' small
business loans were secured by their home and another residence).
169. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha, 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157 Cal. Rptr.
482, 487 (1979).
170. Id. (citing Goodman & Seaton, Forward:Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings of the
California Supreme Court, 62 CAniF. L. REv. 309, 346-47 (1974)).
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having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for
another's benefit in matters connected with such undertaking. 17 The

issue of whether a fiduciary relationship exists between lender and
borrower has influenced recent California courts in refusing to extend

tort damages to borrowers for a lender's breach of the implied
covenant. 172 The relationship in most lender/borrower situations, as

compared to the insurance context, has been found to be that of
debtor and creditor, not fiduciary. 173 In determining that no fiduciary
relationship exists between lender and borrower, many courts have
focused on language from cases in the bank/depositor context. 74 The
existence of a debt between a bank and a depositor does not create
a fiduciary relationship because no trust and confidence is placed in
the bank. 75 The principle that a fiduciary relationship does not exist

171. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, 564 (5th ed. 1979). See also BAJI No. 12.36 (1986)
(providing that "[a] fiduciary or confidential relationship exists whenever under the circumstances trust and confidence reasonably may be and is reposed by one person in the integrity
and fidelity of another.").
172. See, e.g., Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735,
741 (1989) (finding that Foley precludes extending tort recovery to the lender/borrower context
based on the "quasi-fiduciary" relationship described in Commercial Cotton v. United California Bank); Mitsui Manufacturers Bank v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. App. 3d 726, 731, 260
Cal. Rptr. 793, 796 (1989) (finding no fiduciary relationship in a commercial transaction
because the parties were of equal bargaining strength).
173. Generally the relationship between a bank and its depositors and borrowers is creditor/
debtor, not fiduciary, and as such there is no duty of disclosure upon the bank. See, e.g.,
Lee v. United Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 466 So.2d 131, 134 (Ala. 1985); Citizens and
Southern Nat'l Bank v. Arnold, 240 Ga. 200, 40 S.E.2d 3, 4 (1977); Delta Diversified v. Cit.
& South. Nat'l Bank, 171 Ga. App. 625, 320 S.E.2d 767, 776 (1984); Limoli v. First Georgia
Bank, 147 Ga. App. 755, 250 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1978); Farmer City State Bank v. Guingrich,
139 Ill. App. 3d 416, 487 N.E.2d 758, 764 (1985); Dewitt Cty. Public Bldg. Comm'n v.
DeWitt Cty., 128 Ill. App. 3d 11, 469 N.E.2d 689, 700 (1984); Bank Computer v. Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank, 110 Ill. App. 3d 492, 442 N.E.2d 586, 594 (1982); McElrean v. Union Nat'l
Bank of Chicago, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 414 N.E.2d 128, 134 (1980); Kurth v. Van Horn, 380
N.W.2d 693, 696 (Iowa 1986); First Bank of Wakeeney v. Moden, 235 Kan. 260, 681 P.2d
11, 13 (1984); Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, 640 P.2d 1235, 1243 (1982);
Dugan v. First Nat'l. Bank in Wichita, 227 Kan. 201, 606 P.2d 1009, 1014 (1980); Centerre
Bank of Kansas City v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 53 (Mo. App. 1985); Umbaugh
Pole Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St. 2d 282, 390 N.E.2d 320, 323 (1979); Federal Land
Bank of Baltimore v. Fetner, 269 Pa. Super. 455, 410 A.2d 344, 348 (1979); Burwell v. South
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 288 S.C. 34, 340 S.E.2d 786, 790 (1986).
174. See Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 476, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 740
(1989) (citing Morse v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 142 Cal. App. 3d 228, 232, 190 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1983); Downey v. Humphreys, 102 Cal. App. 2d 323, 332, 227 P.2d 484 (1951)) (stating that
it is inconsistent with "past authority and current trends in the law" to regard the relationship
between bank and depositor as fiduciary in nature because it is "axiomatic" that the relationship
between banker and depositor is of debtor and creditor).
175. Downey v. Humphreys, 102 Cal. App. 2d 323, 332, 227 P.2d 484, 490 (1951). But
see Lawrence v. Bank of America, 163 Cal. App. 3d 431, 437, 209 Cal. Rptr. 541, 545 (1985)
(stating that the facts of the transaction may support a finding that a fiduciary relationship
existed between bank and depositor).
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between bank and depositor has been extended by courts to apply
"with even greater clarity" to the relationship between lender and
76

borrower. 1
While lenders may not hold themselves out as fiduciaries to the
general population, for over fifty years courts have accepted the
position that the particular facts of a transaction between bank and
customer may give rise to a fiduciary relationship. 77 In Stewart v.
Phoenix National Bank,178 the Arizona Supreme Court noted two
factors that gave rise to a "confidential relationship" between a
bank and a depositor. First, the bank had acted as the depositor's
financial advisor for twenty-three years. 179 Second, the depositor had
relied on the bank's advice. 80 Decisions from other jurisdictions
support the contention that a fiduciary relationship may arise from
the facts of the particular relationship between bank and customer,
relying primarily on the same two factors advanced in Stewart.'8'
Indeed, the particular facts of a lender/borrower relationship have
2
also been held to give rise to a fiduciary relationship.1
The position advanced by this Comment is not that the lender/
borrower relationship is an inherently fiduciary relationship. Rather,
the lender and borrower, through the course of their dealings, may
form a relationship in which the borrower reposes faith, confidence,
and trust in the judgment and advice of the lender. When this occurs,
it is perfectly consistent with prior case law and common sense to
treat the relationship as fiduciary in nature.'83

176. Price, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 476, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 740. See supra notes 110-121 and
accompanying text (discussing the pre-Foley decisions which found a fiduciary relationship in
the bank/depositor context and the lender/borrower context).
177. See Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937).
178. 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937).
179. Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 64 P.2d at 106.
180. Id. In Stewart, the plaintiff alleged that not only was he a customer of the bank and
relied on the bank as a financial advisor, but further, that the bank's officers and directors
repeatedly told him of their friendship for him, giving the plaintiff the belief that they would
not take financial advantage of him. Id.
181. See Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188, 193-94 (Mont. 1984) (finding a fiduciary
relationship where the bank acted as the customer's financial advisor for twenty-four years
and the customer relied on the bank's advice); Dolton v. Capitol Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n.,
642 P.2d 21, 23-24 (Colo. App. 1981) (finding a fiduciary relationship when there is a repose
of trust by the customer along with an acceptance or invitation of such trust on the part of
the lending institution).
182. Dolton v. Capitol Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n., 642 P.2d 21, 23-24 (Colo. App. 1981).
183. A fiduciary "relationship exists when there is a reposing of faith, confidence and
trust, and the placing of reliance by one upon the judgment and advice of the other." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, 564 (5th ed. 1979).
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b.

Adhesive Nature of Banker/BorrowerRelationship

Under Egan, once a fiduciary relationship has been established, an
adhesion contract must also be shown before tort remedies for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are appropriate
in the insurance context. 184 Adhesion contracts have been defined as
contracts offered for goods or services on an essentially "take it or
leave it" basis; the weaker party, who is denied the opportunity to
bargain, may obtain the product only by acquiescing to the form
contract.18 In an adhesion contract, the only choices available to the
consumer are complete adherence, or outright rejection. 18 6 Whether
the contract entered into by a borrower is adhesive will depend
largely on the amount being borrowed and the sophistication of the
borrower. Typically, larger transactions will be negotiated, while
smaller ones will not. Consequently, some borrowing contracts are
adhesive, and some are not.187 Where the borrowing contract is an
adhesion contract, the second factor required by Egan to show the
existence of a special relationship is satisfied.
c. Other Concerns in Extending Tort Remedies to Lender/
Borrower Relationships: The Difficulty in Formulating a Rule
The traditional separation between tort and contract law obviates
the need to determine when tort remedies for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing are appropriate: under the
traditional approach, tort remedies are never appropriate since the
action is inherently based in contract. 8 The Foley court argued that
another reason for denying tort damages to an employee for an
employer's breach of the implied covenant is the difficulty in for-

184. See supranotes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing the factors that Egan describes
as necessary to the existence of a special relationship).
185. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 564 (5th ed. (5th ed. 1979).
186. FARNswoRTH, CoNTRAcTS, 295 (1982).
187. See Comment, Lenders' Liability-The Shift From Contract to Tort Doctrine Deters
Banks From Enforcing Unjustified and Detrimental Contract Provisions, 21 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 369, 379-80 (citing Purdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216
Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985)).
188. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 683, 765 P.2d 373, 399, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 227 (1988) (stating that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was

developed under contract law).
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mulating a rule assuring that only "deserving" cases of breach of
189
the implied covenant receive tort relief.
In demonstrating the difficulty in formulating a test to determine
when a tortious discharge in violation of the implied covenant of
good faith has occurred, the Foley court noted a test proposed by
one commentator. 19 Under the proposed test, the plaintiff must
demonstrate an assertion of a right or denial of an obligation which
is unreasonable and made in bad faith, and which inhibits the injured
party's ability to find adequate substitution for the value of the
agreement. 19' The problem with this test, according to the Foley
court, is that while it serves to limit the number of recoveries for
wrongful discharge, it does not limit the initiation of a claim based
on almost any discharge.1 92 Further, such claims could rarely be
disposed of by demurrer or summary judgment. 9
In Khanna v. Microdata Corp.,'1 9 4 a California court of appeals

described another test to determine when an employee could sue in
tort for violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 95 The Khanna court held that a claim that the implied
covenant was tortiously breached in the employment context could
be sustained when it was shown that the employer had exercised bad
faith extraneous to the contract, and had fired the employee with
the intention of frustrating the employee's enjoyment of the employment contract. 96 Foley expressly disapproved of the test proposed in
Khanna, stating that the requirement of "bad faith" would not serve
to limit the potential reach of tort damages. 97 Further, such a
requirement would not distinguish between discharges that are properly remedied by contract damages and discharges for which tort
remedies are appropriate. 19 Thus, almost any discharge could give
rise to tort litigation. 199

189.

Id. at 697, 765 P.2d at 399, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 237.

190. Id. at 697 n.35, 765 P.2d at 399 n.35, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 237 n.35.
191. Id. (citing Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and FairDealing, 73 CMU'r. L. REv. 1291, 1305 (1986)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985).
195. Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d at 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
196. Id.

197.

Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 697-99, 765 P.2d at 399-400, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38 (1988).

198. Id.
199. Id. at 699, 765 P.2d at 400, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239. It is interesting to note that the
Foley court did not disapprove of the test formulated in Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal.
App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984). In Wallis, the Court of Appeals analogized the
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As this Comment argues, the relationship between lender and
borrower is substantially similar to that existing between insurer and
insured. In those fact situations where the relationships are similar,
tort damages are appropriate for breach of the implied covenant in
the lending context, just as tort damages are appropriate in the
insurance context. The concern expressed in Foley that any breach
of the implied covenant could lead to tort liability is disposed of by
requiring that the lender stand in a fiduciary relationship to the
borrower. 2° Assuming the facts are not in dispute, claims of a
fiduciary relationship between lender and borrower could be disposed
of by demurrer and summary judgment. 20 ' Where a substantially
similar relationship has been shown, the standard for tort relief in a
lender/borrower relationship should be the same as that in the
insurance relationship: whether the bank has given at least as much
consideration to the borrower's interest as it has to its own. 20 2 Thus,
it is feasible to formulate a rule which will determine when tort
damages for breach of the implied covenant in the lending context
are warranted. Further, use of the rule proposed in the insurance
context will allow summary judgment and demurrer for claims which
do not warrant tort remedies.
C. ProtectioA Already Afforded Against Tortious Conduct
The final element considered by the Foley court in refusing to
extend tort remedies to the employment context for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is that employees
are already afforded numerous protections against improper terminations. 203 Foley noted that employees are protected from discriminatory discharges and discrimination resulting from the exercise of
rights under workers' compensation law or participation in union

employment context to the insurance context to determine whether tort damages were appro-

priate for breach of the implied covenant. See supra note 64 (discussing the test proposed in
Wallis).
200. See supra notes 132-199 and accompanying text (discussing the situations in which a
fiduciary relationship may arise between lender and borrower).
201. See David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 203 Cal. App. 3d 884, 890, 250 Cal. Rptr.
339, 341 (1988) (stating that the existence of a fiduciary duty is a question of law).
202. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha, 24 Cal. 3d 809, 819, 598 P.2d 452, 456, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482, 486 (1979) (citing Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711, 521 P.2d 1103 (1974)).
203. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 693, 765 P.2d 373, 396, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 235 (1988).
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activities. 204 Further, employees may obtain tort damages for discharges in violation of public policy. 2 5 According to the Foley court,

additional remedies for employees are for the legislature to enact,
2°6
not the judiciary.
The banking industry is heavily regulated by both federal and state
statutes . 207 Many of these statutes operate for the protection of the
banking customer. Federal protections provide for the insurance of
depositor's funds with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC).20 State regulations in California proscribe the relationship
between a bank and its customers. 209 The California Commercial
Code describes when a bank may charge a customer's account; 10 a
bank's liability to a customer for wrongfully dishonoring a check;21 '

and the customer's right to stop payment of a check.21 2 Additionally,
the California Financial Code regulates the statements banks must
make to depositors concerning charges and interest on their accounts, 213 and the liability of the bank for failure to make such

statements.2 1 4 While the above provisions operate to protect the bank
customer, they do not protect bank borrowers from such breaches
of the implied covenant as found in Barrett and other cases. 215 Thus,
the lender/borrower context is significantly different from the employment context with regard to the statutory provisions provided to

204. Id. at 693 n.30, 765 P.2d at 396 n.30, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 211 n.30.
205. Id. Discharges in violation of public policy are the type described in Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Corp., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). The Foley
court approved of Tameny's holding that tort damages may be extended for a discharge in
contravention of public policy. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 667 n.7, 765 P.2d at 374 n.7, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 215 n.7.
206. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 700, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
207. See infra notes 209-15 and accompanying text (showing examples of regulations
imposed on banks).
208. All national banks and all members of the Federal Reserve must carry FDIC insurance.
12 U.S.C. § 1814(b) (1982). The FSLIC is similar to the FDIC in that it provides insurance
for the depositors of savings and loan associations. See L. RIrrER & W.
OF MONEY, BANKINO, AND FINA cAL MARKERs 116 (4th ed. 1983).
209. CAL. COM. CODE §§ 4401-07 (West 1964).

SIBER, PUCIPLES

210. Id.§ 4401.
211. Id. § 4402.
212. Id. § 4403.
213. CAL. FIN. CODE § 865.4 (West 1989).
214. Id. § 865.6.

215. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 1985) (good
faith used to impose duty on lender to provide notice before refusing to advance funds,
although loan agreement gives bank sole discretion); Reid v. Key Bank of Southern Me., Inc.,
821 F.2d 9, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1987) (bank may not capriciously terminate a loan agreement). See
supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (describing Barrett and tortious breach of the
implied covenant of good faith in the bank/borrower context).
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curb wrongful actions by the dominant party. As such, it is consistent

with Foley to permit tort damages for a lender's breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
CONCLUSION

Under Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., California law limited tort
remedies for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to insurance cases, and cases resembling insurance cases. As
in an insurance case, a borrower seeking to recover tort damages for
a bank's breach of the implied covenant must, therefore, show a
special relationship between the borrower and the bank. The existence
of a special relationship will depend on the facts of the specific case.
To establish a special relationship, the plaintiff must show a fiduciary
relationship between lender and borrower, and that the contract
securing the loan was an adhesion contract. When these two elements
are shown, recovery for tortious breach of the implied covenant
should be allowed.
Additionally, recovery of tort damages in the banking context
should be permitted by Foley because such damages comport with
the economic policy and need for stability elucidated in Foley. In
addition, unlike the situation faced in Foley, there is a lack of legal
protection available to borrowers under current law. The availability
of tort remedies for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in the lending context is not precluded by the Foley
decision. While tort recovery will be heavily fact dependent, California courts after Foley should allow borrowers to sue lenders in tort
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Adam Pressman

